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Abstract 
This study draws on attribution theory and literature from compensation and strategy to 
investigate executives’ perceptions about their influence over the firm’s stock price. We define 
stock price expectancy as the extent to which executives feel that they can influence the firm’s 
stock price.  Results from of a survey of 435 U.S. executives suggest that stock price 
expectancy is related to both attributional and contextual antecedents. Based on these findings 
we discuss implications for the extension of expectancy theory and the design and 
administration of incentive systems.  
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Introduction  
In a recent review, Heneman, Ledford and Gresham (2000) observe that the state of the 
compensation literature is strikingly similar to that of the 1960s when Opsahl and Dunnette 
(1966) called for research to catch up with practice. Heneman and colleagues note that: “Pay 
for performance is increasingly based on collective (team, unit and corporate) rather than 
individual performance…The ratio of variable performance based bay to base pay is 
increasing…These new approaches to compensation are in need of research that helps us 
understand their effectiveness with key design variables that explain success and failure. As in 
1966, the practice of compensation has far outrun the research literature” (2000: 196). 
One of the ways in which compensation practice has outrun research is the widespread 
use of stock option grants which are often used as a motivational tool (Brenner, 1995). Huddart 
observes that “a common rationale for granting an option to an employee is to motivate the 
employee to take actions to increase the stock price” (Huddart, 1994: 211). A common problem 
however, is that such incentives are often designed and administered in ways that seriously 
undermine their capacity to motivate employees (Bannister & Gentry, 1999; Brenner, 1995; 
Heneman, 1998; Milkovich & Milkovich, 1992; Tully, 2000).   
Expectancy theories of motivation (e.g., Vroom, 1964) state that to motivate employees, 
incentive systems must establish a strong relationship between employee effort and 
performance (Expectancy), clearly link performance to rewards (Instrumentality), and make 
rewards large enough to justify the effort required to earn them (Valence). Arguably, a chief 
reason why incentive systems repeatedly fail to motivate employees is because the 
accomplishment of the firm’s desired performance goals lies beyond the control of the 
individual. Nearly a decade ago, Milkovich and Milkovich (1992) observed that: “An often noted 
problem with profit sharing and bonus plans as a motivational tool is the ‘line of sight’ argument. 
Very few employees see a direct connection between their behaviors and their firm’s profits. 
Forces inside the organization (e.g., decisions by executives to relocate facilities or revamp 
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product lines) as well as outside (e.g., changes in exchange and interest rates) weaken the link 
between individual work behavior and corporate profits, particularly for lower level employees” 
(p. 59).  In other words, the failure of incentive systems to motive employees is often attributed 
to a lack of expectancy. This criticism of incentive systems certainly applies to stock options, 
which measure executives’ (and others’) performance using the stock price of the firm. Indeed, 
critics have voiced concerns about the use of stock options as a motivational tool on the 
grounds that stock price is a performance criterion over which even high level executives have 
limited control:  “As a form of compensation, stock options are fundamentally flawed and always 
have been, precisely because their value is largely a matter of luck…The fundamental 
weakness is that most of the rise and fall in their value comes not from good or bad 
management but from the normal ebb and flow of the stock market” (Tully, 2000: 157-158).   
The use of stock options as a motivational tool fits Heneman and colleagues’ (2000) 
description of a compensation practice that has far outrun the research. We know of no study 
that has empirically investigated stock option holders’ perceptions of control over the firm’s 
stock price, nor have we encountered any research on the broader issue of how employees 
perceive stock options from a motivational standpoint. Given that options are so commonly 
used to motivate employee behavior (Brenner, 1995; Tully, 2000), this lack of research 
represents an important gap. As a first step towards filling this gap, the purpose of this paper 
will be to investigate the antecedents of stock price expectancy which we define as the degree 
to which stock option holders (executives in our sample) perceive that they can influence the 
firm’s stock price. We feel that a scholarly investigation of stock price expectancy could 
substantially inform the effectiveness of stock options as a motivational tool and address calls 
for compensation research to guide practice (Heneman, et al., 2000; Opsahl & Dunnette, 1966).    
First, we will briefly review the applied psychological literature for research on 
antecedents of expectancy cognitions and argue that these antecedents seem to be insufficient 
for explaining stock option holders’ perceptions of control over the firm’s stock price. Second, 
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based on these limitations we will review scholarly theoretical and applied (practitioner) 
literature which may inform our understanding of stock price expectancy. From these sources 
we will offer hypotheses and test them with a sample of US executives. Finally, we will discuss 
the implications of the results for both the future development of motivation theory and the 
practical administration and design of stock options as well as other ownership-based 
incentives.   
Review of Motivation Literature:  Determinants of Expectancy Cognitions 
 The applied psychological literature has empirically examined several determinants of 
expectancy cognitions, primarily individual characteristics and some organizational factors 
(Dellva, Wacker, & Teas, 1985). Among individual characteristics, substantial attention has 
been paid to self esteem (Lawler, 1970), self efficacy (Bagozzi, 1978), employee tenure 
(Walker, Churchill, & Ford, 1977), and locus of control (Broedling, 1975). Empirical evidence 
suggests that self efficacy, global self esteem, job tenure, and internal locus of control are 
positively related to expectancy cognitions (Dellva, et al., 1985). A second body of studies has 
investigated organizational factors such as leadership style and organizational communication 
mechanisms as determinants of expectancy. In this vein, initiation of structure and 
consideration (Tyagi, 1982), participative management (Sims, Szilagy & McKenney, 1976) and 
performance feedback (Teas, 1981) have been shown to be positively related to expectancy 
cognitions.  
 It is noteworthy that in the applied psychological literature, expectancy cognitions are 
typically studied in settings where performance is measured at the individual level (e.g., Dellva 
et al., 1985; Porter & Lawler, 1968; Teas, 1981; 1982). Under these circumstances, the 
antecedents previously researched in applied psychology are likely to explain much of the 
variance in expectancy cognitions. However, in settings where performance is measured at 
higher levels of aggregation (e.g., stock price) expectancy cognitions are likely to involve much 
more than the previously studied antecedents.  Stock prices vary as a result of a host of 
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factors—fluctuations in the economy, politics, consumer confidence, etc (Tully, 2000).  It seems 
reasonable to assume that performance measured at the market level is much more complex 
than performance measured at the individual level. As useful as the previously studied 
antecedents have been in predicting individual-level performance expectancies, it seems logical 
that other factors may predict stock-price expectancy. In the current study we propose that 
literature from attribution theory, the applied compensation literature and strategy may be 
particularly relevant to expectancy cognitions.   
Positive Outcomes and Causal Attributions:  The Self Serving Bias.  
Among all of the biases in social cognition, the self-serving bias is regarded as one of 
the most pervasive (Hewstone, 1989: 59). This bias refers to the tendency for people to 
attribute successful outcomes to internal factors such as ability and failures to external factors 
such as chance or task difficulty. The self-serving attributional bias has been detected in 
numerous studies, and enjoys a large body of supporting empirical research (Zuckerman, 
1979). For example, a study by Greenberg, Pyszczyanski, and Solomon (1982) found evidence 
of the self-serving bias among students. Students who were led to believe that they performed 
poorly on a cognitive ability test were more likely to indicate that their performance was 
attributed to their teachers. Conversely, students who were led to believe that they had 
performed well were more likely to attribute their success to their own ability and effort. The 
self-serving bias has been found to be robust across tasks, settings and even cultures, though 
less prominent in eastern cultures (Bradley, 1978; Fletcher & Ward, 1988; Zuckerman, 1979).  
Research from attribution theory strongly indicates that the direction of outcomes has a 
great impact on causal perceptions. Individuals tend to make attributions about causal events 
that favor or protect their ego; research clearly demonstrates that individuals have a tendency 
to take credit for successes and blame external forces for failures on salient outcomes. This 
robust bias may be highly informative to the notion of stock price expectancy. The attributions 
literature suggests that individuals’ perceptions about their influence over firm outcomes will be 
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strongly affected by whether those outcomes are positive or negative. Thus, we propose that 
executives are likely to incorporate a self-serving bias when thinking about their influence over 
the firm’s stock price. Following attribution theory we suggest that stock price expectancy (i.e., 
perceived influence over stock price) will be influenced by the performance of an executive’s 
portfolio of stock options. More specifically, we expect executives who’s portfolio of stock 
options is performing poorly (i.e., a large percentage of options are underwater1) will report 
lower levels of stock price expectancy than executives whose portfolio of stock options is 
performing relatively well (i.e., a smaller percentage of options are underwater).   
A related justification for hypothesizing a negative relationship between stock price 
expectancy and the percentage of stock options underwater is that executives likely envision 
their influence on the stock price to have a positive effect. So, an executive’s general belief 
about stock price appreciation may create an upper limit on the level of personal influence they 
perceive. If executives believe that the stock price will appreciate very little, there is little upward 
movement for them to influence, and vice versa. We would expect a positive relationship 
between stock price expectancy and perceived stock price appreciation. This also suggests that 
the effect of underwater stock options on stock price expectancy may be clearer after 
controlling for variability in executives’ general perceptions about future stock price 
appreciation.   
Hypothesis 1:  Controlling for perceived stock price appreciation, the percentage of 
stock options that are underwater will be negatively related to stock price expectancy, 
such that employees with a higher percentage of under water stock options will report a 
lower degree of stock price expectancy than employees with a lower percentage of 
underwater options.  
                                                 
1
 “Underwater” stock options are those in which the exercise price exceeds the current market price, 
rendering the options virtually worthless. Options are referred to as “in the money” when their exercise 
price is below the market price.   
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Insights on Stock Price Expectancy from Compensation and Strategy  
In addition to attribution theory, literature from the areas of compensation and strategy 
may also inform our understanding of stock price expectancy.   
Employee Level  The compensation literature has identified employee level as a critical 
variable to consider in the design of effective incentive systems. For example, Bannister and 
Gentry (1999) observe that employees at different levels of the firm can only influence certain 
kinds of firm outcomes.  Stock options are problematic in that all option holders share the same 
performance criterion—the stock price—regardless of their position in the firm’s hierarchy.   
Huddart (1994) observes that “Where the employer grants stock options to low and mid-level 
employees it seems likely that the effect of any individual employee’s action or exercise 
strategy on stock price is negligible. Accordingly the incentive effect of these options for those 
employees should be small” (p.212).  In most firms, lower level employees have much less 
input on strategic decisions that could potentially effect outcomes such as firm performance and 
the firm's stock price, thus suggesting a negative relationship between stock price expectancy 
and organizational level.  
We propose that even among high level executives there is variance in the degree to 
which they feel they can influence the firm’s stock price. Moreover, we know of no research that 
has looked that the relationship between stock price expectancy and organizational level, for 
executives or any other employees. 
Hypothesis 2:  Organizational level will positively related to stock price expectancy such 
that the higher the organizational level, the greater the stock price expectancy.   
Board of Director Relationships   
The purpose of boards of directors is to serve as a monitoring device for the 
management of organizations (Barney, 1996). In most corporations today, CEOs and other high 
level executives report to a board of directors which monitors and ratifies their decisions 
regarding the firm’s strategic objectives (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Research suggests that 
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executive boards have become increasingly active in monitoring firm performance and taking a 
more active role in managing the firm’s operations (Kosnik, 1990; Kener & Johnson, 1990). 
Barney (1996) argued that boards of directors can actually be counter productive by over 
supervising executives: “If firms go too far in actively managing a firm on a day to day basis, the 
efficiency advantages of the separation of ownership and control begin to break down.”  
This research from the strategy literature highlights boards of directors as a critical 
contextual factor in understanding stock price expectancy. Intuitively, executives who feel they 
have a supportive board should be more likely to perceive that they individually have an 
influence on the value of stock options because they are less constrained by the board's 
wishes. Executives who have poor relations with their board may be less likely to feel they can 
influence the firm’s stock price. 
Hypothesis 3: Executive board support will be positively related to stock price 
expectancy, such that executives who feel more supported by their board will report 
higher levels of stock price expectancy than executives who feel constrained by their 
board of directors. 
Firm Size   
An important variable likely to be related to expectancy perceptions is firm size. In an 
interview with the author, a line manager at a large, diversified telecommunications corporation2 
observed that “especially in large companies, people don’t see a link between their 
performance and the stock price.” In larger companies, it is possible that a greater number of 
factors influence the stock price as opposed to smaller firms. This may be due to greater 
diversification or competition in a wider range of product markets. For example, in a large 
diversified firm such as GE, one product division may be doing quite well, but have little effect 
on the performance of the company as a whole or little impact on the stock price. On the other 
                                                 
2
 This line manager's firm had recently been acquired by the telecommunications giant.  In an interview 
with the author, he described how perceptions of stock price expectancy had much greater among 
employees prior to the acquisition, when the firm was independent and dramatically smaller.  Personal 
communication (1999) with the author. 
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hand, it may be more feasible (or at least perceived feasible) to influence stock price in a 
smaller company. 
Hypothesis 4.  Firm size measured by the firm’s yearly revenue will be negatively related 
to stock price expectancy.  
Stock Price Volatility  
Stock price volatility may also relate to one’s perceptions of stock price influence. 
Naturally, not all firms experience the same amount of volatility over time, and this is likely to 
influence employee perceptions of stock price expectancy. Tully (2000) notes for example that 
in the recent past, technology stocks have been much more volatile than traditional 
manufacturing or "old economy" stocks "because they are much more hitched to ideas than to 
assets or earnings, and where investors are constantly recalculating these ideas.  Even 
established techs like Yahoo or Intel vary more dramatically in the market than a GE or a Ford” 
(Tully, 2000). Previous research has demonstrated that too much volatility can have negative 
influence on performance (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998). In a sense, stock price volatility may be a 
negative outcome in and of itself.   Consider for example, a stock option that is in the money, 
but whose value fluctuates dramatically. Even though the stock option may be in the money, the 
fact that it is volatile may make it perceptually similar to a stock option that is underwater. This 
suggest that like stock option performance (Hypothesis 1), the volatility of a firm’s stock price 
may similarly associate with an employee’s perceived influence over the firm’s stock price. 
Thus,  
 Hypothesis 5.  Perceived stock volatility will be negatively related to stock price 
expectancy.   
Tenure   
Finally, as noted above, employee tenure has been linked to expectancy cognitions in 
previous applied psychological research (Dellva, et al, 1985). Presumably, employees who have 
greater organizational and job tenure may be more inclined to feel as though they have an 
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influence over the value of their stock options.  Thus, we anticipate that both organization and 
job tenure will be positively related to stock price expectancy.     
Hypothesis 6a.  Organizational tenure will be positively related to stock price 
expectancy.   
Hypothesis 6b.  Job tenure will be positively related to stock price expectancy 
 
Methods 
Procedure and Subjects 
 Surveys were sent to 11,968 high-level managers contained in the database of a US 
based executive search firm. In addition to the survey, information was obtained directly from 
the search firm’s database. It should be noted that this search firm’s clients are the companies 
searching for employees. The search firm does not accept resumes or applications from 
managers searching for jobs; rather, it identifies potential candidates in response to client 
needs by examining publicly available information (e.g., proxy material, professional association 
mailing lists). Thus there is no reason to expect that participants of this study have higher 
turnover intent or are searching more actively than the general population of U.S. managers.  
The surveys were prepared and mailed by the search firm. Surveys were encoded so 
that those returned could be matched with information contained in the search firm's database. 
Participants were instructed to return the survey (business reply envelope included) directly to 
the researchers, under assurances of strict confidentially. A total of 1,601 subjects responded 
to the survey (13.38% response rate). Respondents were primarily married (90%) and male 
(89%), and had been in their jobs an average of 2.7 years and in their present organization 5.5 
years. The average respondent had a yearly total compensation (base plus bonus) of $236,188, 
and was two levels below the CEO. Due to the moderate response rate, we assessed whether 
respondents were representative of non-respondents by comparing the two groups on 
information contained in the search firm’s database (e.g., salary, demographics, company size). 
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Only age revealed a statistically significant difference (respondent mean=49.15, non-
respondent mean=50.00) and it was small. For the analyses of the current study, usable data 
were available for 435 executives in the sample.  A large percentage (55%) of the respondents 
were excluded from these analyses because they are employed in private companies.   
Measures 
Dependent Variable  
Stock Price Expectancy.  Stock price expectancy was measured with a 4 item Likert 
scale based self-report measure (scale ranging from 1= strongly disagree to 6=strongly 
disagree). Sample items include, “I can personally influence the value of my stock options” and 
“My personal performance influences my company’s stock price.” Interitem reliability was 
acceptable, α=.85.  The mean response on stock price expectancy was 3.84 (with a standard 
deviation of 1.34), suggesting that the average executive in this sample felt a marginal degree 
of influence over the value of his/her stock options.   
 Independent Variables 
 Perceived Stock Price Appreciation.  Perceived Stock price appreciation was measured 
with a single item. Participants rated on a scale of 1 (very large depreciation in price) to 3 (price 
will not significantly change) to 5 (very large appreciation in price) on the following question:  
“Which of the following best describes your outlook toward your company’s share price for the 
upcoming year?” The mean response was 3.68 (with a standard deviation of .85), suggesting 
that on average, executives felt that the stock price would increase slightly over the next year.   
Percentage of Stock Options Underwater.  The percentage of underwater stock options 
was assessed by asking respondents how many stock options they had from their present 
company and how many of those options were currently underwater (i.e., meaning that at the 
date of the survey the strike price exceeded the market price for a given option share). The 
percentage of underwater options was then calculated by dividing the total number of 
underwater options by the total number of options held. At the time of the survey (administered 
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in the fall of 2000), 25% of respondents had all of their options underwater and nearly 46% had 
all of their options in the money. The mean percentage of underwater options was 37%, yet the 
modal percentage was 0%. 
 Organizational Level.  Organizational level was measured with a single item.  
Respondents indicated how many levels below the CEO their position was at the time of the 
survey. The mean organizational level was 1.94 (Standard deviation was 1.45), suggesting that 
this sample was comprised of mostly upper level executives.  For the sake of clarity, we reverse 
coded the data (by multiplying the raw organizational level times negative one), such that a 
higher number would reflect a higher organizational level.   
Executive Board Relations.  Executive board relations was measured with three items 
designed to assess the relationship between the executive and the board of directors. Items 
were based on a Likert scale format, where respondents indicated on a scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) the extent to which they agreed with items such as “This 
executive board or council understands my problems and needs” and “This executive board or 
council would ‘bail me out’ at its expense when I really need it.”  Interitem reliability was 
acceptable, α=.81.  The mean response was 3.57 (with a standard deviation of 1.15) 
suggesting that on average executives felt that their boards were supportive.   
 Perceived Stock Price Volatility.  Perceived stock price volatility was measured with a 
single item. On a scale of 1 (very volatile) to 5 (very stable) subjects were asked to rate the 
overall volatility of their company’s share price. The mean volatility rating was 2.58 (with a 
standard deviation of 1.23) suggesting that on average executives perceived a moderate 
degree of volatility in their share price.   
Firm Size.  Firm size was measured with the log of firm revenue obtained from the 
search firm’s archival database. The mean firm revenue from the sample was $428 million 
(median = $450 million) suggesting that the sample consists primarily of large firms.   
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 Tenure.  Two measures of tenure were assessed using survey items. Organizational 
tenure was measured by asking participants to indicate how many years they had worked for 
their present employer. Job tenure was measured by asking participants to indicate how many 
years they had worked in their present position. Mean organizational and job tenure were 5.52 
and 2.69 respectively indicating a modest amount of tenure.   
 
Results 
 Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations and interrelationships between the 
dependent, independent and control variables. Hypotheses 1-6 were tested using standard OLS 
regression (see Table 2). Stock price expectancy was regressed on to the independent 
variables corresponding to the hypotheses (see Table 2). 
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Table 1 
Correlation Matrix 
Variable Mean SD Stock 
Option 
Expectancy 
Perceived 
Stock Price 
Appreciation 
Percentage 
of options 
Underwater 
Level Executive 
Board 
Relations 
Revenue Org 
Tenure 
Job 
Tenure 
Stock 
Price 
Volatility 
Stock Option 
Expectancy 
3.86 1.34 .85         
Perceived 
Stock Price 
Appreciation 
 
3.68 .854 .187** --        
Percentage 
of options 
Underwater 
.28 .55 -.135** -.162** --       
Level 
 
 
1.94 1.45 -.528** -.035 .008 --      
Executive 
Board 
Relations 
3.57 1.14 .458** .189** -.096* -.311** .81     
Log of 
Revenue 
 
20.26 2.59 -.194** .001 .016 .167** -.079 --    
Org Tenure 
 
 
5.52 6.30 -.106** 
 
-.061 .023 .153 -.024 .049 --   
Job Tenure 2.69 2.99 -.002 -.045 .000 -.111** .038 -.035 .382** --  
Perceived 
Stock Price 
Volatility 
2.58 1.23 .000 .063 -.193 .075* .077* .022 .002 .016 -- 
 
Note:  **p<.01,  *p<.05, Where appropriate, inter-item correlations (alpha) are reported in bold on the diagonal.   
Stock Option Expectancy  CAHRS WP02-04 
    
 
Page 17 
 
Table 2 
OLS Regression Analysis 
Step Variable β t p 
DV: Stock Price Expectancy    
 Perceived Stock Price Appreciation .157 2.585 .010 
 % of Stock Options Underwater -.220 -2.309 .021 
 Organizational Level .393 10.164 .000 
 Executive Board Support .347 7.320 .000 
 Log of Firm Revenue -.027 -1.338 .182 
 Perceived Stock Price Volatility -.016 -.401 .688 
 Organizational Tenure .000 .101 .920 
 Job Tenure -.027 -1.482 .182 
 
 
Note: N=435, R2=.40, Adjusted R2=.39 
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The model shows moderate support for Hypothesis 1 and strong support for Hypotheses 
2 and 3. The model shows that after controlling for the perceived stock price appreciation3, 
stock price expectancy is negatively related to the percentage of stock options underwater (β = 
-220, p< .05), lending support to the prediction that outcomes influence expectancy cognitions 
in a self-serving direction.  
In addition, the model demonstrates that organizational level (β = .393, p< .001) and 
executive board relations (β = .347, p< .001) are strongly related to stock price expectancy both 
in the direction predicted (Hypotheses 2 & 3). Specifically, employees at higher organizational 
levels and greater board support perceived greater influence over their stock price. In fact these 
effects are the most robust of the model.  
Finally, Hypotheses 4-6 were not supported. Firm revenue (our measure of firm size), 
perceived stock price volatility, and tenure (both organizational and job) were not significantly 
related to stock price expectancy.   
 
Discussion 
 This study has sought to fill an important gap in our understanding of expectancy 
cognitions by testing attributional and contextual determinants of stock price expectancy.  
Results from the present study uncover some interesting initial insights and suggest areas for 
future research. First, these results provide support that outcomes affect expectancy cognitions. 
After controlling for perceived stock price appreciation, executives whose portfolio of stock 
options was “performing poorly” (i.e., where a large percentage were under water) reported 
lower levels of stock price expectancy than executives whose portfolio of options was 
performing relatively better (i.e., where a smaller percentage of options were underwater). This 
relationship, though moderate in magnitude appears consistent with the self-serving bias found 
in the attribution literature (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). These results appear to be consistent with 
                                                 
3As expected, perceived stock price appreciation was significantly related to stock price expectancy (β = 
.157, p < .05). 
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the interpretation that executives attribute less influence over negative outcomes and more 
influence over positive outcomes. Causal attributions and ego defense mechanisms may play a 
prominent role in employees’ perceptions about how their effort relates to performance, 
particularly when performance is measured at high levels of aggregation (e.g., at the market 
level). Motivation theory may be enhanced by greater attention to attributional processes in the 
development of expectancy cognitions.   
 Future research is necessary before conclusive statements can be made about the self-
serving bias in expectancy cognitions toward stock options or any other type of incentive 
system.  However, if the self-serving bias does influence expectancy cognitions, it would raise 
interesting implications for the design and administration of incentives. Traditional logic might 
suggest that when options are underwater, it would be a strong motivator to work to raise the 
stock price. Yet our results suggest that employees may be less motivated by underwater 
options than they would by in the money options. More specifically, if employees attribute less 
influence over the value of options (less expectancy) when the options are performing poorly, 
then the overall motivational force will be low (and vice versa).   
 The strategic compensation and literature has long suggested that pay should be made 
contingent on performance criteria that can be influenced by employees (Gerhart, 2000; 
Milkovich and Newman, 1993). This study addressed variables that the strategic compensation 
literature suggest are likely to be important to stock price expectancy. First, we hypothesized 
that stock price expectancy would be higher for executives at higher levels of the firm’s 
organizational hierarchy. Our results strongly supported this hypothesis and lend credence to 
the argument that employees at low levels do not feel as thought they have an impact on high 
level outcomes such as the stock price and the value of stock options (Huddart, 1992; Milkovich 
& Milkovich, 1992; Tully, 2000). The strong relationship between organizational level and stock 
price expectancy provides further support for concerns about the motivational impact of stock 
options on lower level employees.    
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 Finally, stock price expectancy was strongly related to executives’ relationships with 
their board of directors. Executives highly constrained by their boards may be less motivated by 
stock options because of low expectancy. In general, these findings suggest that expectancy 
cognitions are complex—involving both attributional and contextual elements that play an 
important role in their development.  
 In summary, our findings support calls in the applied compensation literature for 
incentives to be tied to performance criteria that are within the influence of individual employees 
(Bannister & Gentry, 1999; Lawler, 1987; Milkovich & Milkovich, 1992). Our findings also appear 
to be consistent with arguments that broad based stock option grants are unlikely to motivate 
lower level employees (Tully, 2000). 
Limitations and Future Research 
 First, this study looked at only a few of perhaps innumerable contextual determinants of 
stock price expectancy. For example, an executive’s relationship with the board of directors 
represents just one of a host of control or governance related variables that could impact 
expectancy cognitions. Environmental variables such as legislation, consumer spending habits, 
and political forces are all contextual variables that could be studied in the future.   
 A second important limitation of the study is its between subjects design. A more 
powerful test of the self-serving bias could be accomplished with a within subjects design using 
longitudinal data. It would be interesting, for example, to examine how executive’s expectancy 
cognitions change as the value of their stock options fluctuates. However, one strength of this 
study is our use of an employee sample to investigate theories typically explored in laboratory 
settings.  
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Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this study represents a step toward addressing Heneman et al’s (2000) 
call for compensation research to catch up with compensation practice. In this paper we have 
noted that stock options represent an interesting platform by which expectancy cognitions can 
be studied. Initial evidence suggests that stock price expectancy cognitions may reflect a self- 
serving bias, and further are strongly linked to contextual variables, underscoring the 
importance of linking rewards to performance criteria that are within the reach of employees.   
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